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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) networks consist of sensors,
actuators, mobile and wearable devices that can connect to the
Internet. With billions of such devices already in the market
which have significant vulnerabilities, there is a dangerous threat
to the Internet services and also some cyber-physical systems
that are also connected to the Internet. Specifically, due to
their existing vulnerabilities IoT devices are susceptible to being
compromised and being part of a new type of stealthy Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, called Mongolian DDoS, which is
characterized by its widely distributed nature and small attack
size from each source. This study proposes a novel anomaly-
based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that is capable of timely
detecting and mitigating this emerging type of DDoS attacks. The
proposed IDS’s capability of detecting and mitigating stealthy
DDoS attacks with even very low attack size per source is
demonstrated through numerical and testbed experiments.
Index Terms—IoT networks, DDoS attacks, anomaly detection,
sequential detection, nonparametric methods
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of Internet of Things (IoT) has been one of
the most significant technological advances of the last decade
[1]. With the development of various miniaturized embedded
systems and many web services along with cloud comput-
ing, it is virtually possible to make any isolated system to
communicate with another machine. Moreover, the increased
capabilities of new System on Chip (SoC) devices, and a
drastic reduction in their sizes have led to an exponential
increase in the number of devices that communicate through
the Internet. With the number of IoT devices in use today
already in a few billions, and with an exponential growth, the
amount of data generated and transmitted is also witnessing
a proportional increase. This has made the IoT paradigm a
prime target for a legion of attackers, hackers, cybercriminals
and occasionally governments [1].
Unfortunately, the security of IoT devices is not able to
keep up with the hardware development and now more and
more vulnerabilities are detected on a regular basis leading to
security threats and privacy concerns [1]. For example, such
compromised devices can be utilized to perform Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. DDoS is a type of cyber-
attack in which the perpetuator attacks an online service
typically by flooding traffic using a large number of sources.
Volumetric attacks as the name suggests are characterized by
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enormous amount of traffic, and they normally do not require
a large amount of traffic to be generated by the hackers them-
selves causing it to be the simplest and most common type of
DDoS attack [2]. In this paper, we consider this type of DDoS
attacks, especially the stealthy ones, which are challenging
to detect and mitigate due to their widely-distributed nature
and low-rate anomalous traffic from each source which can
easily bypass traditional filters (i.e., stealth attacks). In stealthy
DDoS attacks, such as the recent Mongolian DDoS attacks
[3], although the increase in traffic from each source is small,
collectively they are still capable of achieving their goal of
disrupting the targeted service due to being widely distributed.
Although a number of practical solutions have been deployed
against DDoS, many problems still exist [4], especially due to
the new genre of DDoS attacks through IoT devices.
A. DDoS via IoT
There has been a sharp increase in the number of IoT
devices with an estimated number of 8.4B devices in 2017
which is expected to reach 20B by 2020 [5]. According to a
study by Gartner, a high percentage of new businesses and
systems will include an IoT component by 2020 [6]. The
convenience provided by IoT technologies has led to a wide-
scale deployment of a variety of Internet-connected sensors
such as thermostats, security cameras, smart lights among
many others. Unfortunately, the rapid spread of IoT also brings
about a proliferation of security risks. Even though IoT is
evolving at an expeditious pace, it is still very much in its
inception stage. Hence, at this stage there is a significant risk
that hacked IoT devices can be used for nefarious purposes
such as being used as a part of a botnet to launch DDoS
attacks [4].
Currently, IoT network security faces four major challenges:
(C1) Minimally invasive mitigation: Because of the distributed
nature of recent DDoS attacks, it is very difficult to
detect the attacking devices. However, the attack should
be mitigated with minimal interruption of services to
benign users who want to legitimately use the services
under attack.
(C2) High dimensionality: Considering the large number of
devices in a typical IoT network, and the abundant
data generated by those devices, computationally efficient
solutions that can achieve effective network monitoring,
i.e., joint monitoring of devices, are required.
(C3) Unknown attack patterns: Since there is a wide range of
vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit, and new attack
techniques are continuously developed by attackers, the
predictability of attack patterns is quite low compared
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2to the traditional Internet security. Hence, conventional
signature-based detection techniques, as well as paramet-
ric probabilistic models are not feasible.
(C4) Timely detection and mitigation: Due to the highly inter-
connected IoT ecosystem including the Internet and crit-
ical infrastructure such as Smart Grid, and the potential
disastrous effects of cyberattacks, timely detection and
mitigation of attacks is crucial.
We state some of the real-world examples to scrutinize the
damage that can be caused by cyberattacks via IoT.
1) The Mirai botnet, that was launched in 2016, caused
one of the most prolific series of attacks in the DDoS
history [7], [8]. This particular botnet infected numerous
IoT devices (primarily older routers and IP cameras), and
reached data rates higher than 600Gbps. Through flooding
the DNS provider Dyn, the Mirai botnet took down
many popular websites such as Etsy, GitHub, Netflix,
Shopify, SoundCloud, Spotify, and Twitter. Mirai took
advantage of devices running out-of-date firmware, and
relied on the fact that most users do not change the default
usernames/passwords on their devices. The fact that its
source code has been released on a hacker forum (and
now it is available online [9]) facilitated its derivations.
2) In November 2016, hackers shut down the heating of two
buildings in the city of Lappeenranta, Finland. This was
another DDoS attack, and in this case, the attack was
specifically targeted towards an attribute of smart home.
The attackers managed to cause the heating controllers
to continually reboot the system in a loop so that the
heaters never worked. The attack was significant because
the temperatures are well below freezing at that time of
the year, and such a scenario can be life threatening.
3) In early 2017, Verizon Wireless released a report that
included an unnamed university that experienced an at-
tack from more than 5,000 IoT devices, such as vending
machines and smart light bulbs.
These examples portray the severity of the situation if such
botnets are acquired by sophisticated hackers and employed
against critical infrastructures such as Nuclear Plants, Smart
Grids, etc.
B. Related Works
DDoS attacks via IoT networks are relatively less addressed
compared to other security issues in the IoT enviornment.
However, it is recently attracting considerable interest, e.g.,
[4], [7], [8]. In [10]–[13], a wide range of vulnerabilities
because of which conventional signature-based detection tech-
niques fail, are discussed. In [14], authors propose a solution
to UDP flood attack in an IoT environment using 6LoWPAN
and IEEE 802.15.4. However, it has high overheads and com-
plex architectures and components which do not suit an IoT
environment [15]. An agent-based DDoS mitigation approach
is proposed in [16]. The authors propose a two-part algorithm
in which the attack detection part has been performed in the
border router. A similar entropy-based solution is proposed
in [17], but with the requirement that the packet contents
should be detectable. They also do not consider scenarios
in which the entropy does not change but the number of
packets do. Xiang et al. [18] proposes an information metric
approach to quantify the differences between legitimate and
attack network traffic by assuming that the legitimate traffic
follows a Gaussian distribution, whereas the attack traffic
follows a Poisson distribution. Machine learning algorithms
are also gaining attention as recent anomaly detection research
shows promise [19]. Doshi et al. [20] presents the performance
of popular machine learning algorithms such as SVM, k-
nearest-neighbors, neural networks etc. in detecting malicious
traffic. However, they require training data for malicious
traffic (supervised anomaly detection), and extract features
which are specific to certain IoT devices without considering
other devices that might be present in the network such as
laptops or smartphones. In [21], Nomm et al. proposes using
feature selection with popular anomaly detection techniques
such as one-class SVM to detect IoT botnet attacks. They
use three different approaches for extracting useful features
and provides their results over the N-BaIoT dataset. Kurt
et al. [22] proposes an online anomaly detection algorithm
based on dimensionality reduction, that is capable of detecting
anomalies in high dimensional settings. They also present
their results using the N-BaIoT dataset. Meidan et al. [23]
proposes using deep autoencoders for detecting DDoS attacks
at the network level. They achieve small false positive rates by
training a deep autoencoder for each individual device in the
network, which might not scale well to large networks with
many devices. They also use a window-based majority voting
scheme to detect attacks, which is not well suited for quick
detection.
C. Contributions
In this paper, we propose a practical anomaly-based de-
tection and mitigation technique for IoT-based DDoS attacks,
especially the challenging stealthy DDoS attacks with data
rate increase per device as low as 10%, which is significantly
lower than the considered rates in the literature, and can
easily bypass most of the existing approaches. Specifically, the
proposed technique is based on a statistical anomaly detection
algorithm called Online Discrepancy Test (ODIT) that miti-
gates the attack with minimal interruption of regular service;
scales well to large systems; does not rely on presumed
baseline and attack patterns; and achieves quick and accurate
detection and mitigation thanks to its sequential nature. The
major contributions of this paper are as follows:
• A novel detection and mitigation technique for stealthy
DDoS attacks is proposed, and its time and space com-
plexity is analyzed;
• Asymptotic optimality of the proposed detector is proven
in the minimax sense as the training data size grows;
• Solution to a dynamic scenario in which the number of
devices in the network changes is provided;
• A comprehensive performance evaluation is provided
using a testbed implementation, the N-BaIoT dataset, and
simulations.
We first present the problem formulation in Sec. II, then
provide the proposed IDS in Sec. III, experimental and testbed
results in Sec. IV, discuss the limitations in Sec. V, and finally
conclude the paper in Sec. VI.
3II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND BACKGROUND
A. System Model
In the considered architecture (Fig. 1), each IoT device
sends its data to the node connected to it. Nodes direct the
data traffic to a center, such as a web server, data center or
utility center. The architecture is scalable in such a way that a
node may represent a smart home consisting of tens of devices
or a smart building/neighborhood access point consisting of
thousands of devices.
Each device typically has different data communication
characteristics. In particular, the data content is typically
different (for example, a thermostat would have considerably
smaller packet size as compared to a CCTV camera), and the
communication protocol used might be different (such as TCP,
UDP or HTTP). Also, for the same device the data rates might
differ significantly based on the location or type of connection,
e.g., a laptop connected via a fiber optic cable might send
1000 packets per second whereas the same device would be
sending 10 packets per second on a slower connection. Even
the active communication frequency varies considerably, e.g.,
devices like printers update its status once a minute, whereas
CCTV cameras send data every second. In this work, our
only assumption is that they perform a packet-based data
communication.
Center
Node 1 Node n Node N
IoT Devices
Fig. 1. System model consisting of IoT devices such as thermostat, CCTV,
light bulb, smartphone, etc. In the threat model, the bold arrows imply an
increased packet rate.
B. Threat Model
We consider a volumetric DDoS attack scenario in which
data rates (packet/sec.) from a number of devices increase at
some point in time (see Fig. 1). Particularly, we consider a
threat model in which some IoT devices are compromised and
start to send more than usual number of data packets. We do
not assume further attack specifications such as knowledge on
how devices are compromised (e.g., through a vulnerability in
the firmware, spoofing attack, man-in-the-middle attack, use
of default password), the attack magnitude (i.e., percentage of
increase) and duration, and whether the data content changes
or not. It is not tractable to mitigate such attacks at the center
since accurate identification of all attacking devices is not
tractable due to the highly distributed nature of the attacks.
Moreover, due to the low-rate nature of the attacks, it is very
difficult to detect them locally at the nodes. We propose a
general Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that can run locally
and is capable of detecting and mitigating an attack even
when it is not possible to inspect the data content, which is a
prerequisite for many IDS algorithms, e.g., [17], [24].
Although the standard volumetric attacks that are studied
in the literature include high increase in the data rate of
a device, with the increasing number of compromised IoT
devices low-rate stealthy DDoS attacks (e.g., with a 20%
increase per device) started to become threatening [3]. Due
to the proliferation of IoT, cyber-criminals can launch widely-
distributed and highly-effective stealthy DDoS attacks, that can
bypass conventional filters and IDSs. Hence, in this paper we
study DDoS attacks with data increase rates as low as 20%
per device. There are existing works which consider low-rate
DDoS attacks (e.g., [18]), nevertheless the considered increase
rates are still significantly higher than what we consider in this
paper.
As a result of such widely-distributed DDoS attacks (e.g.,
the almost uniform distribution of attack traffic in Mirai [25]),
it is not tractable to have a single global solution running at
the server end, and thus we propose in the next section a local
IDS that runs at each node. Such local solutions also facilitate
accurate mitigation.
III. PROPOSED ANOMALY-BASED IDS
In this section, we present our detection and mitigation
strategy for the proposed IDS. As shown in Fig. 2, we detect an
attack based on the cooperative test statistic, and once an attack
is detected, we monitor each device individually to identify
the attacking devices (see Sections III-B and III-C). We also
analyze the computational complexity and a practical scenario
in which the number of devices in the network are dynamic
in nature.
Fig. 2. Proposed Intrusion Detection and Mitigation System
A. Proposed Detection Strategy
The heterogeneous nature of an IoT network makes para-
metric anomaly detection approaches for DDoS detection less
effective since they assume probabilistic models for nomi-
nal and anomalous conditions. In practice, it is difficult to
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Fig. 3. ODIT procedure with M1 = 5, M2 = 10, α = 0.2, k = 2.
Dn1 = d[logL
n
1 − log L˜n(α)] and Dn2 = d[logLn2 − log L˜n(α)] are used as
in (1) for online anomaly detection (see also Fig. 4). Test points are from
the same nominal distribution as training points, which is a two-dimensional
Gaussian with independent components, 0.5 mean, and 0.1 standard deviation.
know/estimate the anomalous and even the nominal probability
distributions. Hence, parametric anomaly-based IDSs, as well
as many conventional signature-based IDSs are not feasible
in addressing stealthy DDoS attacks through IoT. Recently,
an online and non-parametric detector called the Online Dis-
crepancy Test (ODIT) was proposed for detecting persistent
and abrupt anomalies [26]. Thanks to its nonparametric op-
eration, ODIT does not need to know baseline or anomalous
distributions beforehand, hence can address the challenge (C3)
stated in Section I-A. ODIT is a sequential method which
accumulates evidence in time, and makes a decision at each
time based on the accumulated evidence so far, instead of
making a hard decision based on a single data point. This
sequential nature of ODIT is tailored for timely detection,
thus it is able to address the challenge (C4). Moreover, ODIT
can handle monitoring large number of devices together (see
Sections III-D and IV), which addresses the challenge (C2).
In this work, we propose a novel modification for ODIT,
and prove that this modified version, as the training data
size grows, asymptotically becomes the Cumulative Sum
(CUSUM) test, which is the optimum sequential change detec-
tion algorithm in the minimax sense. CUSUM is a parametric
test which assumes both the nominal and the anomalous
distributions are completely known [27].
We next show the procedure for the proposed ODIT-based
IDS for a node n, which observes a d-dimensional normalized
data vector xnt ∈ [0, 1]d, where d is the number of devices,
at each time t. Here, in the context of DDoS attack detection,
xnt denotes the number of packets received from the d devices
in the network at time t and normalized by the corresponding
maximum number of packets for each device. Normalization
of each dimension of xnt into [0, 1] is performed to deal
with the typical heterogeneity in the data communication
characteristics of IoT devices.Then, in Section III-B, we show
how to achieve cooperation among nodes.
Training: Given an attack-free training dataset XnM =
{x˜n1 , . . . , x˜nM} which represents the baseline (i.e., nominal)
operation, we begin our training procedure.
1) Randomly split XnM into two subsets XnM1 and XnM2 with
M1 and M2 points, where M1 + M2 = M , for com-
putational efficiency, as in the bipartite GEM algorithm
[28].
2) For each point x˜ni in XnM1 find the kth-nearest-neighbor
(kNN) distance L˜ni with respect to the points in XnM2 .
3) For a significance level α, e.g., 0.05, store the (1− α)th
percentile L˜n(α) of kNN distances {L˜n1 , . . . , L˜nM1} to use
as a baseline statistic for computing the anomaly evidence
of test instances.
The training procedure is illustrated in Fig. 3, where the
training set consists of M = 15 points, which is then randomly
split into two sets of M1 = 5 points (denoted by green) and
M2 = 10 points (denoted by blue). In this example, for each
point in the first set, we find the second-nearest-neighbor (k =
2) distance with respect to the second set. The largest kNN
distance (α = 0.2) among the points in the first set is used as
the baseline statistic L˜n(α).
Testing: When a new data xnt is observed at time t,
1) Compute
Dnt = d[logL
n
t − log L˜n(α)] (1)
where Lnt is the kNN distance of the new data point x
n
t
with respect to the points in XnM2 , and L˜n(α) is obtained
in the training.
2) Treating the statistic Dnt as a positive/negative evidence
for anomaly accumulate it over time as in CUSUM:
snt = max{snt−1 +Dnt , 0}, sn0 = 0, (2)
where Dnt is given in (1).
3) Decide to continue taking a new data point xnt+1 if the
accumulated evidence snt is not sufficient for raising an
attack alarm, and stop and raise an alarm at the first time
snt ≥ h, i.e., at time
Tn = min{t : snt ≥ hn}, (3)
where hn > 0 is a predetermined threshold.
As compared to anomaly evidence Dt = Lt − L˜(α)
presented in the original ODIT algorithm [26], we use the
form given in Eq. 2. This modification enables an asymptotic
optimality proof, which is presented in Theorem 1. The
intuition behind this modification is to explicitly show the
analogy between the attack evidence Dt and log-likelihood
ratio.
Theorem 1. When the nominal distribution f0(xnt ) is finite
and continuous, and the attack distribution f1(xnt ) is a uni-
form distribution whose support includes xnt , as the training
set grows, the anomaly evidence Dnt converges in probability
to the log-likelihood ratio,
Dnt
p→ log f1(x
n
t )
f0(xnt )
as M2 →∞, (4)
i.e., the proposed ODIT detector converges to CUSUM, which
is minimax optimum in minimizing expected detection delay
while satisfying a false alarm constraint.
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Fig. 4. ODIT statistic and decision procedure using the setup in Fig. 3 and
anomalous test points from uniform distribution over [0, 1]. Anomaly starts
at t = 6, and detected at t = 7 with the shown threshold.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Since the proposed detector does not train on anomalous
data or assume any model for anomaly, the uniform distribu-
tion condition on f1 for asymptotic optimality is expected.
Parameter Selection: The detection threshold hn mani-
fests a trade-off between minimizing the detection delay and
minimizing the false alarm rate, as can be seen in Fig. 4.
Particularly, smaller threshold facilitates early detection, but
also increases the probability of false alarm. In practice, hn can
be chosen to satisfy a given false alarm rate. The number of
neighbors k also affects the trade-off between early detection
and small false alarm rate. Smaller k would result in being
more sensitive to anomaly, hence supports earlier detection,
but at the same time it causes to be more prone to the false
alarms due to nominal outliers. Larger k would result in
vice versa. The choice for M1 and M2 is typically skewed
towards M2, i.e., M2 > M1, since M2 determines the degree
of resemblance between kNN distance likelihood under the
nominal case, as explained in Theorem 1. The significance
level α is an intermediate parameter whose effect can be
compensated by the threshold h. As a rule of thumb, a small
α value, such as 0.05, should be first selected, and then hn
should be set to satisfy a desired false alarm rate.
Remark 1. A training set that is free of anomaly can be
obtained through either human supervision or through an
isolated secure system. We should emphasize here the dif-
ference between anomaly and outlier. The training set may
contain outliers that are generated under no-attack conditions.
Outliers correspond to “tail events” that can occur under
nominal settings with low probability. Although outliers are
rare under normal operations, they can still exist in the
training set, and their natural existence does not harm the
regular operation of the proposed detector. On the other
hand, anomaly is a change in the system behavior, i.e., in
the probability distribution of the generated data. In other
words, anomaly can be defined as the existence of “persistent
outliers”, as opposed to the sporadic nominal outliers.
B. Cooperative Operation
Multiple nodes running the proposed IDS given in Eq.
(1)–(3) can cooperate for earlier detection and mitigation
of attacks by leveraging the hierarchical structure shown in
Fig. 1. Following the cooperative CUSUM with independence
assumption in [29] we propose a cooperative detector which
sums the local statistics computed at the nodes to obtain a
global statistic st =
∑N
n=1 s
n
t . That is, at each time t, each
node n updates its local statistic snt using (2) and transmits it
to the center, which sums them to obtain the global detection
statistic st. Then, the center decides whether or not there
is an attack similarly to (3), i.e., raises an alarm at time
T = min{t : st ≥ h}. This cooperative detector can detect
attacks earlier than the single-node ODIT detector thanks to
the spatial diversity, i.e., accumulated attack evidences from
multiple nodes. Note that the statistics from nodes without any
attacked device typically take small values close to zero, but
never become negative according to (2). Thus, they do not neg-
atively contribute to the global statistic st, and consequently
do not cause extra delay in detection.
The cooperative scheme through summing local statistics
in a hierarchical architecture enables the proposed detector
to easily scale to arbitrarily large networks. The optimal
statistical detection would normally require multivariate anal-
ysis for all the devices in the entire network. However, due
to the abundance of IoT devices this is not feasible; and
more importantly due to the natural hierarchical structure
in IoT networks such a large-scale multivariate analysis is
unnecessary. Specifically, IoT devices are grouped under nodes
such as smart home routers, and devices under different
nodes can be typically modeled independently under no-
attack conditions. Although an attack will normally correlate
them, it is reasonable to relax that constraint since a practical
attack strikes devices asynchronously, i.e., each of the attacked
devices has different attack onset times. This relaxation is
critical for CUSUM to be applicable to any multi-dimensional
setting since it is not tractable to estimate the set of attacked
devices to perform multivariate analysis [29]. After detection,
the mitigation procedure given in the next subsection can be
applied at each node.
C. Mitigation Strategy
Timely detection of a DDoS attack is a necessary, but not
a sufficient condition for ensuring the security of a system.
We need a mitigation strategy that is capable of stopping the
DDoS attack by identifying the attacking IoT devices, and then
blocking the traffic originating from those devices.
We perform an in-depth analysis to determine which IoT
devices are causing the increase. We begin by examining
the cooperative statistic st calculated in Sec. III-B and de-
termining which nodes are causing the increase. Once the
attacking nodes are identified, we examine every dimension,
which represent an IoT device connected to the node, of the
distance Lnt , calculated in Sec. III-A. (L
n
t )
2 corresponds to the
squared Euclidean norm of the d-dimensional distance vector
ynt = x
n
t − x˜n(k) whose jth entry yn,jt is the distance of the
data from device j at time t to the jth dimension of kth nearest
6neighbors, i.e., (Lnt )
2 = ‖ynt ‖22. If yn,jt comes out large, then
it contributes to a large Lnt towards an alarm, which provides
an evidence that the device is under attack. Hence, after an
alarm is raised at time T , we
1) first determine the time instance τ when the test statistic
st started to increase since the last time it was zero (τ = 6
in Fig. 4), which can be seen as an estimate for the attack
onset time,
2) then, compute the average statistic
s¯n =
1
T − τ + 1
T∑
t=τ
snt (5)
for each node n, and compare it with a threshold θ1 to
determine the attacking nodes, i.e., node n has attacked
devices if s¯n ≥ θ1.
3) then, for each node identified as attacking, compute the
average distance
y¯n,j =
1
T − τ + 1
T∑
t=τ
yn,jt (6)
for each device j under it, and compare it with a threshold
θ2 to decide as attacking or not, i.e., device j is identified
as attacking if y¯n,j ≥ θ2.
As usual the selection of threshold θ1 and θ2 controls
a balance between the False Positive Rate (FPR) and True
Positive Rate (TPR). As shown in Fig. 15, the proposed
mitigation technique achieves high TPR for almost all FPR
even in the challenging attack scenario investigated in Section
IV. We should note that the procedure in Eq. (6) requires
some memory to store the most recent distance values for all
dimensions local to the node performing the procedure.
Combining the detection and mitigation strategies, the pro-
posed IDS technique is summarized in Algorithm 1.
D. Computational Complexity
The following theorem shows that the proposed algorithm
can scale well to large systems.
Theorem 2. The online time complexity and space (i.e.,
memory or storage) complexity of Algorithm 1 linearly scales
with M2, the number of points in the second training set, and
d, the number of devices, i.e., O(M2d). The offline training
time complexity is O(M1M2d).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remark 2. There are efficient ways of finding (approximate)
k nearest neighbors that scale even better to high-dimensional
systems. For instance the method proposed in [30] has a time
complexity of O(λd) in online testing where λ is the maximum
number of points to examine for finding k nearest neighbors.
λ can be chosen much smaller than M2 at the expense of
decreasing the accuracy of kNN approximation. Hence, a
balance between approximation quality and computational
complexity should be sought while choosing λ. Consequently,
using a fast kNN method instead of straightforward computa-
tion the real-time operation capability and/or the scalability
of the proposed method can be significantly enhanced.
Algorithm 1: Proposed detection & mitigation algorithm
1: Initialize: s0 = 0, t = 0
2: for n = 1, . . . , N do
3: Partition training set into XnM1 and XnM2
4: Determine L˜n(α)
5: end for
6: while st < h do
7: t← t+ 1
8: Get new data {xnt } and compute {Dnt } as in (1)
9: snt = max{snt +Dnt , 0}
10: st =
∑N
n=1 s
n
t .
11: end while
12: Declare attack at T = t
13: for n = 1, . . . , N do
14: Compute s¯n as in (5)
15: if s¯n ≥ θ1 then
16: for j = 1, . . . , d do
17: Compute y¯n,j as in (6)
18: if y¯n,j ≥ θ2 then
19: Block traffic from device j
20: end if
21: end for
22: end if
23: end for
E. Dynamic Environments
A major challenge for any anomaly-based intrusion detec-
tion system is adaptability to dynamic environments. This
means that the system should be adaptable to changes in the
environment, while still recognizing abnormal activities. In a
dynamic IoT network such as a university or a shopping mall,
the number of devices may frequently change based on the
number of people, time of the day, day of the year etc. With
varying number of devices over time the challenge for the
proposed IDS is computing the kNN distance under varying
number of data dimensions.
A key observation here is that data rates are specific to appli-
cations rather than devices. For instance, video streaming has
certain data rates regardless of the streaming device. Hence,
considering a list of applications that are used in the network,
such as web browsing, music and video streaming, we can deal
with the changing number of dimensions. Specifically, we first
collect training data for the extreme scenario with maximum
number of devices running each application simultaneously.
During online testing, at each time we modify the training set
by ignoring the unused dimensions for each application, and
compute Lnt .
Since there is a huge number of possible combinations for
the number of devices running each application, performing
the expensive training procedure (see Theorem 2) for each
such combination to compute the baseline statistic L˜n(α) is not
feasible. Hence, we propose to build a function approximator
for L˜n(α). We collect data for several different combinations,
and compute L˜n(α) for each such combination. Using the
number of devices running each application as input we train
a regression model to estimate the L˜n(α) value for a given
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Fig. 5. Comparison of the estimated L˜n
(α)
statistic to the computed one for
different combinations with increasing number of devices.
combination. The results for Gaussian process regression is
shown in Fig. 5. A simpler method (e.g., linear regression) or
a more sophisticated method (e.g., deep neural network) can
be used for the regression model. In Fig. 5, we compare the
estimated L˜n(α) statistic to the computed one for different com-
binations with increasing number of devices. We see that the
estimated statistic closely matches that of exact ODIT, which
is infeasible to compute for all combinations. Furthermore,
the baseline statistic L˜n(α) depends on the selected significance
level α, which is a design parameter. Our simulations show
that a small mismatch between the estimated and computed
L˜n(α) values is not critical for the algorithm’s performance.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we evaluate the performance of the proposed
IDS using real data, an IoT testbed, and simulations.
A. N-BaIoT Dataset
We firstly consider the N-BaIoT dataset [23] 1, which
contains data from various IoT devices under both nominal
and attack conditions. The network consists of of nine devices,
namely a thermostat, a baby monitor, a webcam, two doorbells,
and four security cameras connected via WiFi. The dataset
description, as well as attacks considered in our experiments
are presented in Table I. We do not consider UDP and TCP
attacks in our experiments since the provided data does not
correlate with typical UDP and TCP attacks.
Our results show that the proposed ODIT-based IDS signif-
icantly outperforms the deep autoencoder-based IDS proposed
in the N-BaIoT paper [23], and by extension Isolation Forest
[31], SVM [32] and LOF [33], which are shown to be
outperformed by the autoencoder method. In Fig. 6, we present
the false positive rate and the average detection delay when
each device is under attack. Here, the average detection delay
is analogous to the false negative rate as all the misclassified
anomalous instances would contribute to the average detection
delay. The proposed ODIT-baed method achieves much more
accurate and quicker detection than the autoencoder-based
1This dataset is available at the UCI Machine Learning Repository.
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Fig. 6. Comparison between deep autoencoder-based IDS and the proposed
ODIT-based IDS in terms of false positive rate (top) and average detection
delay (bottom). The x-axis corresponds to the index of the attacked device.
Fig. 7. IoT testbed consisting of NodeMCUs, smart switches, security camera,
Amazon Echo Show, laptop, tablet, and Raspberry Pi.
method except for device 8. On further analyzing the data,
we see that there are a few outliers in the data for device 8,
which causes some false alarms. Note that by increasing the
decision threshold h, we are able to reduce the false positive
rate at the cost of a slightly higher detection delay. Conversely,
a smaller detection delay can be achieved by setting a lower
threshold at the cost of a few more false alarms. Thanks to its
sequential nature, the ODIT-based IDS detects the attacks right
after it occurs while satisfying very small false alarm rates.
Whereas, the autoencoder-based IDS applies a majority voting
in a moving window for attack detection, thus its detection
delay is at least half the window size. The optimum window
sizes reported in [23] for each device are used for comparisons.
B. Testbed Results
We next present a hardware implementation of our pro-
posed attack detection and mitigation algorithm. Even though
8TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF THE N-BAIOT DATASET PROPERTIES, BOTNET INFECTIONS, AND CONSIDERED ATTACK TYPES
Dataset Properties Botnet Infections Considered Bashlite Attacks Considered Mirai Attacks
Device
ID
Device Make and Model Device Type Mirai BASHLITE Combo Junk Scan TCP UDP ACK Scan SYN UDP UDP Plain
1 Danmini Doorbell ! ! ! ! ! - - ! ! ! - !
2 Ennio Doorbell x ! ! ! ! - - - - - - -
3 Ecobee Thermostat ! ! ! ! ! - - ! ! ! - !
4 Philips B120N/10 Baby Monitor ! ! ! ! ! - - ! ! ! - !
5 Provision PT-737E Security Camera ! ! ! ! ! - - ! ! ! - !
6 Provision PT-838 Security Camera ! ! ! ! ! - - ! ! ! - !
7 SimpleHome XCS7-1002-WHT Security Camera ! ! ! ! ! - - ! ! ! - !
8 SimpleHome XCS7-1003-WHT Security Camera ! ! ! ! ! - - ! ! ! - !
9 Samsung SNH 1011 N Webcam x ! ! ! ! - - - - - - -
Fig. 8. Setup for hardware implementation.
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Fig. 9. Time series for number of packets sent by a computer (top), a
NodeMCU (middle), and an Amazon Echo Show (bottom).
there are several dataset already available, none of them
addresses stealthy DDoS attacks. In existing works, even a
300% increase from the nominal data rate of a device is
considered low-rate DDoS, e.g., [18]. However, due to the
exponential increase in the number of IoT devices, much
lower data rates, e.g., a 30% increase, might be sufficient
for performing effective DDoS attacks, as exemplified by the
recent Mongolian DDoS attacks [3]. Also, most of the datasets
TABLE II
TESTBED ATTACK CHARACTERISTICS
Attack Name Attack Type Magnitude CompromisedDevice
Http Flooding Application Low-Rate Node MCU
ICMP Flooding Volumetric Low-Rate Node MCU
Ping of Death Protocol Low-Rate Laptop
UDP Flooding Volumetric High-Rate Laptop
seem to concentrate only on vulnerable devices, but in a typical
network, there are also devices that cannot be compromised
easily, and account for a significant amount of background
data. We first present the testbed setup, and then provide the
experimental results using the testbed data.
Testbed Setup: To demonstrate a typical IoT network, we
collected the network traffic data from devices that were con-
nected via Wi-Fi to an access point, which is wire connected
to a router. For sniffing the network traffic, we performed
port mirroring on the router, and recorded the data using
Wireshark. The goal here is to design a setup that is as close
to a real life scenario as possible for studying stealthy DDoS
attacks. We consider a network consisting of 15 popular IoT
devices, namely a laptop computer, a tablet, 7 NodeMCUs, 4
smart switches, an Amazon Echo Show device, and a security
camera as shown in Fig. 7. The purpose of using a computer
and a tablet is to consider devices which cannot be easily
compromised yet they account for a significant amount of
traffic passing through the router. The NodeMCUs, which may
represent various IoT devices on the market, are configured to
update their status on a local server. A Raspberry Pi acts as a
command and control (C&C) server which is used to start and
stop attacks. In Fig. 8, we show the setup for our hardware
implementation. A comparison between the number of packets
transmitted from a computer, a NodeMCU, and an Amazon
Echo Show over a period of time is shown in Fig. 9. It is seen
that each device has two major operating states: an active state
and an idle state. However, there is a stark difference between
the transmission patterns for each device.
Attack Models & Results: We implemented 4 different
attacks, as shown in Table II. The data was captured in pcap
format by using Wireshark and is publicly available 2. In Http
flooding, at t = 80 sec., we slightly increase the mean rates
of updating the server for two of the NodeMCUs. Particularly,
there is small increase in the number of Get requests from two
2https://github.com/kevaldoshi17/DDoSAttackDetection
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Fig. 10. Time series for total number of packets sent over the entire network
without (top) and with the stealthy Http flooding attack (bottom).
NodeMCUs. To depict that the attack magnitude does not have
to be consistent across all devices, we increase the mean packet
rate of NodeMCU 1 by 10% and of NodeMCU 2 by 30%.
In Fig. 10, we show a comparison between the total number
of packets sent over the entire network with and without the
stealthy Http attack. It is seen that due to the low-rate nature
of the attack, there is no visible increase in the total number of
packets. Hence, filter-based methods which monitor the total
number of packets transmitted in the network, would fail to
detect such a stealthy attack. In all cases, the input to the
proposed IDS is the number of each packet type from each
individual device.
In Fig. 11, we see that from t = 0 to t = 80, the ODIT
statistic under the Http attack does not increase considerably,
but after t = 80, it steadily increases. This figure is taken
from a real-time demonstration which is available online 3.
By adjusting the threshold we can have a trade-off between
the detection delay and number of false alarms. In Fig. 12, we
compare the proposed ODIT-based IDS with the information
metric-based algorithm proposed in [18] in terms of average
detection delay under all attack cases. The method in [18]
uses an information distance metric based on the generalized
(Re´nyi) entropy. It uses a window to compute the information
metric on the aggregate traffic at each node, which causes loss
in time resolution, and also in early detection ability. Since
ODIT monitors each packet type from every individual device,
it is able to detect the attack with a much smaller detection
delay for the same false alarm rates.
Similarly in the other three attack cases, ODIT quickly and
accurately detects the attacks by closely monitoring the data
traffic in each type from each device thanks to its multivariate
nature. It takes much longer for the information metric IDS
to detect the attacks at the same false alarm rate as there
is no significant increase in the number of total number of
packets. Although in ICMP flooding, the data rates of the two
NodeMCUs are again increased 10% and 30%, this time it
3https://youtu.be/zQexZgB5AMs
TABLE III
NOMINAL DATA MODEL FOR DIFFERENT IOT DEVICES.
Data Model
IoT Devices
Active
State
Probability
Mean
Packet
Rate
Idle
State
Probability
Mean
Packet
Rate
Thermostat 0.25 25 0.75 5
Smart Light 0.05 10 0.95 5
Security Camera 1 80 0 0
Smart Printer 0.05 75 0.95 5
Smart TV 0.3 120 0.7 10
is easier for the information metric method to detect since
the number of ICMP packets in the network is much smaller
than the number of Http packets. In the case of ping of death
attack, which results in an increase in the number of ICMP
packets, the proposed IDS achieves zero detection delay in all
trials. Finally, in the UDP flood attack, we considered a higher
attack rate by increasing the nominal data rate of the laptop
by 100%. In this case, the performance of information metric
method improves, but ODIT still outperforms it by detecting
the attack under 0.2 second on average for a false alarm rate
of 0.01.
C. Simulation Results
We finally present simulation results to evaluate the per-
formance of the proposed IDS in a large network with many
nodes, where a stealthy DDoS attack from many compromised
IoT devices can actually take down a server.
Simulation Setup: The simulation setup consists of 10
nodes each of which monitors 100 devices (Fig. 1). The IoT
devices considered here are those that are most likely to be
compromised or devices that are present in every smart home.
The devices are assumed to have two states of operation, idle
state and active state. The assumed probabilities of the devices
being in idle or active state are given by Table III. We inject
the attack traffic of different rates into the simulated dataset,
and apply the proposed detection and mitigation scheme to
diagnose these attacks. We perform this repeatedly for different
kinds of scenarios in which various combinations of devices
get attacked to compute the Average Detection Delay vs. False
Alarm Rate (i.e., false alarm probability) performance.
In each node, we assume data from each IoT device is
independent and identically distributed (iid) following the
pattern given in Table III. The probabilities listed are based
on heuristics and standard day-to-day usage of the mentioned
devices. For example, a smart TV is considered to be used
approximately 7 to 8 hours in a day, so its active state
probability is given as 0.3. With the shown probabilities,
devices may or may not switch state after a session. We
consider the following session durations: 5 sec. for thermostat,
10 sec. for smart light, 40 sec. for smart printer, 900 sec. for
smart TV, and “always on” for security camera. The mean
packet rates are determined by considering the amount of
data that is transmitted per second and the average packet
size. For each device, the number of packets are generated
using the mixture of two Gaussian distributions defined by
the active state probability, mean packet rates and a common
standard deviation, chosen as 5. To obtain the number of
10
Fig. 11. Live implementation of the proposed IDS in the stealthy Http flooding attack case. At t = 80 attack starts by increasing the data rate of device 1
by 10% (third from top) and device 2 by 30% (bottom). In such a stealthy attack, there is no visible change in the total number of packets in the network
(second from top). The detection statistic of the proposed IDS steadily increases right after the attack, and alarms when it crosses the threshold (top).
packets, the generated real-valued numbers are rounded to the
nearest nonnegative integer. For the purpose of simulations,
the training data consists of 40 hours of attack-free data from
100 different devices in each node.
Attack Model: Here we consider a practical scenario in
which the IoT devices could be under attack, but the node
is assumed to be secure. To parameterize the attack size,
we consider 10% of the devices to be compromised. The
attacked devices are randomly selected to assume a general
model. During the attack phase, the data rates of the selected
devices are increased slightly by 10%. To demonstrate the
effectiveness of such a stealthy attack, we plotted in Fig. 13 the
total number of packets received by the server when attacked
from 100,000 devices with 10% increase in their data rates.
Comparisons: We compare our proposed model with an
IDS based on cooperative CUSUM [29], which knows the
exact parameters of the nominal model and the anomalous
model. CUSUM knows exactly the mean and standard devi-
ation of the Gaussian distribution, as well as the probability
of being active for each device. Note that due to rounding
to the nearest nonnegative integer value, the real probability
distribution of number of packets deviates from the generative
bimodal Gaussian. Hence, the proposed ODIT detector even
sometimes outperforms CUSUM, which exactly knows the
generative Gaussian model. The results for Average Detection
Delay vs False Positive Rate are shown in Fig. 14. We see
that the cooperative ODIT-based IDS, proposed in Section
III-B, performs better than the clairvoyant CUSUM detector,
which exactly knows the generative probabilistic model, for
false alarm rates less than 0.1. It significantly outperforms the
information metric method proposed in [18], which monitors
the aggregate traffic at each node. In Fig. 14, it is seen
that the cooperation among nodes facilitates earlier detection
by our algorithm (ODIT vs. Cooperative ODIT). Through
the proposed computationally efficient cooperation scheme,
given in Section III-B, the ODIT-based IDS is able to handle
large networks with thousands of devices. This result can
be easily extended to even larger networks with millions
of devices. Finally, in Fig. 15, we evaluate the mitigation
performance of the proposed method (see Section III-C). Since
the method in [18] monitors the aggregate traffic at nodes, it
is not straightforward for it to detect the attacking devices.
Thus, to evaluate our mitigation performance, we consider
the data filtering method, which simply applies a threshold
to the observed raw data. The reported Area Under the Curve
(AUC) values in Fig. 15 illustrate the successful mitigation
performance of the proposed method under a challenging
stealthy attack scenario.
V. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we proposed a novel intrusion detection system
which is capable of quickly and accurately detecting and
mitigating a broad set of IoT-empowered attacks, in particular
stealthy low-rate DDoS attacks. However, there are still some
limitations which need to be addressed to make the system
more robust to attacks in the future. First, it is assumed that
the nominal behavior of the devices does not change over
time, so the IDS needs to be trained only once. However,
in a real system implementation the IDS needs to be updated
periodically. Secondly, feature extraction plays an important
role as number of packets or packet size might not always
exactly represent the characteristics of a real network. For
future work, we plan to investigate other aspects of dynamic
networks such as continual learning under changing nominal
network traffic.
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Fig. 12. Comparison of the proposed ODIT-based IDS and the information metric-based IDS in [18] for attacks presented in Table II.
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Fig. 13. Impact of stealthy DDoS attack on the server. The attack consists
of 100,000 devices with 10% increase in their data rates.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the proliferation of IoT devices, and the ease of
triggering DoS attacks even by unsophisticated malicious
parties, there is an increasing need for developing solutions
to DDoS via IoT, especially the recent stealthy DDoS attacks.
In this context, we presented a general and emerging threat
model for hierarchical IoT networks. We then introduced a
novel intrusion detection and mitigation framework that em-
ploys an online, scalable and nonparametric anomaly detection
algorithm. Through real and simulated data, as well as an IoT
testbed we evaluated the performance of proposed detection
and mitigation scheme under challenging stealthy DDoS attack
scenarios. Applications of the proposed scheme to large and
dynamic networks with varying number of devices were also
considered.
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Fig. 14. Average detection delay vs. False positive rate for the proposed
cooperative ODIT-based IDS, the IDS based on cooperative CUSUM [29],
and information metric-based IDS [18]. The network consists of 10 nodes
each of which has 100 devices connected to it. 10% of the devices attack
with 10% increase in data rate with respect to their nominal rates.
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Appendix – Timely Detection and Mitigation of
Stealthy DDoS Attacks via IoT Networks
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PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Consider a hypersphere St ∈ Rd centered at xnt with radius
Lnt , the kNN distance of x
n
t with respect to the training set
XnM2 . The maximum likelihood estimate for the probability
of a point being inside St under f0 is given by k/M2. It is
known that, as the total number of points grow, this binomial
probability estimate converges to the true probability mass in
St in the mean square sense [34], i.e.,
k/M2
L2→
∫
St
f0(x) dx
as M2 →∞. Hence, the probability density estimate
fˆ0(x
n
t ) =
k/M2
Vd(Lnt )
d
,
where Vd(Lnt )
d is the volume of St, converges to the actual
probability density function, fˆ0(xnt )
p→ f0(xnt ) as M2 → ∞,
since St shrinks and Lnt → 0. Similarly, considering a
hypersphere S(α) ∈ Rd around x˜n(α) which includes k points
within its radius L˜n(α), we see that as M2 → ∞, L˜n(α) → 0
and
fˆ0(x˜
n
(α)) =
k/M2
Vd(L˜n(α))
d
p→ f0(x˜n(α)).
Assuming a uniform distribution
f1(x) = f0(x˜
n
(α)), ∀x,
we conclude with
log
k/M2
Vd(L˜n(α))
d
k/M2
Vd(Lnt )
d
= d
[
logLnt − log L˜n(α)
]
p→ log f1(x
n
t )
f0(xnt )
as M2 →∞.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In online testing (see lines 6-11), the most expensive part is
to compute Dnt , in particular L
n
t . And within L
n
t the expensive
part is to find the kth nearest neighbor, which is O(M2d)
if computed straightforwardly by computing the distance of
test point to all M2 training points. The space complexity of
the algorithm is due to storing M2 training points, each of
which is d-dimensional, i.e., O(M2d). Note that the both time
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and space complexity of the mitigation part shown in lines
13-23 is O((T − τ + 1)d) where T − τ + 1 is a bounded
number close to the detection delay, typically much smaller
than M2. In training, to compute L˜n(α) shown in line 4, kth
nearest neighbor among M2 points are computed for each
of M1 points, requiring O(M1M2d) computations. However,
training is performed once offline, so the complexity of online
testing is usually critical for scalability.
